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A B S T R A C T  
How can the study of comparative criminal justice avoid the opposite  angers of 
ethnocentricism and relativism? The problem is examined taking as an example 
Cavadino and Dignan’s recent analysis of differences in prison rates. The case 
is made that more attention needs to be given to understanding how different 
criminal justice systems actually produce prison rates as well as to interpreting 
the ideas and values that animate those inside and outside the system.
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Comparative criminal justice: Making sense of difference
The task of comparative criminal justice, most scholars would agree, is to 
com pare and contrast our ways of responding to crime with those practised 
else where. It also often involves, even if it does not necessarily have to do 
so, borrowing from, or at least trying to learn from, what is done in other 
places. It would seem obvious therefore that, if it is to be at all helpful, com-
parison requires understanding and interpreting what those in other places 
are actually trying to do. What I want to show in this paper is that the 
implications of this apparently banal point are not always straightforward. 
The reason for this is that it can be difficult not to fall foul of two opposing 
dangers. On the one hand, there is the risk of being ethnocentric – assuming 
that what we do, our way of thinking about and responding to crime, is uni-
versally shared or, at least, that it would be right for everyone else. On the 
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other hand, there is the temptation of relativism, the view that we will never 
really be able to grasp what others are doing and that we can have no basis 
for evaluating whether what they do is right. To get beyond these alternatives 
requires a careful mix of explanatory and interpretative strategies (Nelken 
1994).1 We need to recognize that, although criminal justice practices gain 
their sense from the setting that shapes them and the conditions with which 
they have to deal, they can also be understood by outsiders and need to be 
evaluated according to cosmopolitan and not only local criteria.
But this is easier said than done. It is inevitable that our perception of 
others will be coloured to some extent by our own cultural starting points 
– even when we say that what we are doing is trying to learn from them. 
And criminologists do also have their own shared cultural common-sense. 
We tend to argue that the rise in crime rates is exaggerated by the media 
and the politicians, that we should avoid creating even more deviance by 
over-reacting to offending, that the availability of work and decent housing 
are more effective ways of reducing crime than whatever can be delivered by 
criminal justice. In the face of the changes brought about by neo-liberalism, 
we plead instead for policies based on inclusion, solidarity, tolerance and 
respect for difference. Not least, we recommend that politicians listen to pro-
fessionals rather than seeking easy popularity. There may be little to quarrel 
with in these claims as aspirations. But when our study of other places 
merely confirms what we already thought was true and right, we need to 
be aware that we may not have given sufficient care to analysing the simi-
larities and differences that may lie behind the practices we are studying.
The same applies to the more specific biases that come from our local 
cultural backgrounds. Policy makers in the Netherlands, for example, tend 
to look for pragmatic, practically workable solutions to crime – as they do 
when seeking to resolve other types of problem. In Dutch cultural common-
sense, being pragmatic means not being dogmatic, but elsewhere these terms 
may have a different relationship. In Italy, the term ‘pragmatic’ suggests 
behaviour that is not guided by principles and that therefore borders on 
being unprincipled. Which is not to say the Italians in everyday life are not 
often pragmatic, and the Dutch never principled. Far from it. The point is 
rather how difficult it can be for us to see the limits of our ways of seeing 
things. As the American philosopher Morgenbesser reportedly used to say, 
‘pragmatism is all right in theory’! But if the question is when it would be 
appropriate not to be pragmatic, a pragmatic approach itself may not be 
1 Francis Pakes (2004: 13ff) suggests that those who favour an exclusively interpretative 
approach to social life (I am not in fact one of them) must necessarily be relativists. Whether or 
not this is true is doubtful, but those who rely only on a positivistic strategy certainly do run 
a high risk of ethnocentrism.
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able to provide the answer we need. Likewise, it is impossible to specify, in 
principle, all the contingencies that may play a role in shaping the everyday 
application of principles.
If we are to come close to grasping successfully what other systems of 
criminal justice are actually trying to do, we must avoid attributing to them 
intentions on the basis of what we imagine they should be doing – even if 
these are the best of intentions. Likewise – but this can be even more tricky – 
we should be careful not to deduce intentions from the outcomes being 
achieved. But it is often tempting – especially for the purposes of advancing 
a given agenda in local debates – to try to do just that. A good current 
example in my view can be found in some of the arguments being used as part 
of the important debate concerning the problem of growing punitiveness in 
responding to crime both in the USA and elsewhere. In briefly reviewing this 
debate I shall suggest that criminologists from Anglo-American backgrounds 
engaged in cross-cultural research need to devote more attention to what 
they and others mean by punitiveness and tolerance.
I shall first say something about the so-called ‘punitive turn’ and then 
describe some recent attempts to link punishment to differences in political 
economy. In seeking to show the dangers of ethnocentrism, and the way 
more attention to interpretative questions might help to avoid them, I shall 
illustrate my argument with accounts of what may be some relatively un-
familiar features of penal justice in Italy. The choice of Italy is not only a 
reflection of the fact that this is the country whose criminal justice system 
I now know best. Italy is also, surprisingly, the major European country 
with one of the lowest levels of offenders in prison in proportion to its popu-
lation (Proband 2008).
The ‘punitive turn’: America as dystopia – Europe as 
utopia?
Criminal justice systems today face many common problems and increas-
ingly seem to be responding in similar ways to ‘risk society’ (Beck 1992). As 
Hans Boutellier puts it, people are now seeking a ‘safety utopia’ (Boutellier 
2004). Like all utopias, the attempt to impose this one can be dangerous for 
those who get in the way. But perhaps it is also dangerous for the rest of us! 
Hence the concern amongst many criminologists about growing punitiveness. 
Most of these writers do not argue that prison should be abolished. Still 
less do they claim that punishment is never necessary or justified, or that 
tolerance is always the better option – the decreased social tolerance of 
some forms of criminal or deviant behaviour may even be welcomed. Their 
con cern is about what Willem De Haan has described as the ‘bad conscience 
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of punishment’ (De Haan 1990); the economic and political mobilization 
of punitiveness – especially, but not only, in the United States – that is 
described in books with titles such as Crime Control as Industry (Christie 
1993), ‘Making Crime Pay’ (Beckett 1997), and, most recently, Governing 
through Crime (Simon 2007).
Why is increasing resort to punishment and, in particular, greater use 
of prison widely felt to be necessary and appropriate? Even though all the 
evidence suggests that crime levels have been decreasing, trends in punish-
ment, to a large extent, follow their own timing and have their own logic. 
In his recent influential thesis about what he calls the ‘culture of control’, 
David Garland (2001) offers a pessimistic account of this development, 
arguing that ‘penal welfarism’ has been displaced by the politicization of 
crime and the growth of popular punitiveness. He notes the privileging 
of public protection and the claim that ‘prison works’, and describes the 
changes in the emotional tone of crime policy from decency and humanity 
to insecurity, anger and resentment. What remains controversial, however, 
is how far what others have called ‘the penal turn’ should be seen as a result 
of widespread late-modern changes in social and economic conditions, or 
rather treated as something tied more closely to the political and legal culture 
of the USA. What some observers see as an essential aspect of late modern-
ity others see as ethnocentric projection – an Anglo-American tendency to 
assume that what others do in foreign places and foreign languages is less 
import ant, and that they too are bound to come into line eventually.
Such critics tell us that we can and must avoid the dystopia (Zedner 
2002) of assuming that Europe is also bound to end up with something 
like the bloated US penal system, which now embraces more than 2 million 
prisoners. They insist that we need to recognize and explore the differences 
between the USA and Europe and even within Europe, differences which 
suggest that there are multiple cultures of control rather than just one culture 
of control. Some European countries are seen as exemplifying the possibility 
of maintaining a less punitive climate. Until some years ago, for example, the 
Netherlands was very much in the group of those countries from which it 
was proposed to learn how to be less punitive. But things have changed, and 
it has been calculated that for a period recently the Dutch prison population 
increased at a faster rate even than that in the United States.2 Now it is the 
Scandinavian countries that are seen as beacons of tolerance.
2 Its official level of imprisonment, however – like that of other European countries – is still 
nowhere near the US level, and it has recently again begun to decline.
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Punitiveness and political economy
What explains the existence of contrasts in cultures of control? A valuable 
and innovative contribution to answering this question has been provided 
by Cavadino and Dignan in their book about comparative penal systems 
(Cavadino and Dignan 2006a). Their analysis has rightly been much 
praised,3 and has been put to work by other leading writers who are trying 
to illustrate what they call ‘differences in penal tolerance’ so as to stop the 
dangerous slide in England and Wales towards an ever-expanding prison 
system (see e.g. Lacey 2008; Reiner 2007). Ruling out any direct cor relation 
with cross-national differences in public support for prison sentences, 
Cavadino and Dignan argue that variations in incarceration rates – which 
they take as a rough proxy for levels of punitiveness – are related to con-
trasting kinds of political economy. As seen in Table 1 (a slightly simplified 
version of the table that is the linchpin of their thesis), rates of imprison-
ment in 12 modern industrial societies vary considerably between what they 
call neo-liberal, conservative-corporatist, social democratic, and oriental-
corporatist types of political economy.4
They argue that the neo-liberal societies have the highest prison rates 
because they follow social and economic policies that lead to what they 
describe as ‘exclusionary cultural attitudes towards our deviant and mar-
ginalised fellow citizens’ (Cavadino and Dignan 2006a: 23; 2006b: 447). 
On the other hand, Continental European corporatist societies (which have 
also been described as ‘coordinated market economies’) and, even more, 
Scandinavian social democratic societies, are said to ‘pursue more inclusive 
economic and social policies that give citizens more protection from un-
fettered market forces’ and to ‘see offenders as needing resocialisation 
which is the responsibility of the community as a whole’ (Cavadino and 
Dignan 2006a: 24; 2006b: 448). Other authors have since followed up their 
approach. Lacey (2008), for example, seeks to explain why what she calls 
‘coordinated market economies’ have the opposite effects to neo-liberal 
develop ments, and argues that multi-party political systems are less likely 
to lead to appeals to populism than two-party systems. She also makes, 
though does not develop, the telling point that the corporatist countries 
3 There is much to admire in Cavadino and Dignan’s pioneering work, and I cannot attempt 
to do justice to it here. For example, they also link punitive attitudes to levels of prison 
privatization and the age at which young people are held to be criminally liable – though 
here too some caution is needed. For example, Scotland has an advanced welfare system for 
juveniles despite criminal liability beginning at 8.
4 In addition to quoting most of the 2002/3 figures that they drew on in their 2006 book and 
article, I have added, for comparison, the current 2008 figures. These are not out of line with 
their argument.
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(and also the social democratic ones) that are so good, relatively speaking, 
at offering an ‘inclusive’ approach to their own citizens are perhaps less 
equipped than neo-liberal ones for dealing with the challenge of ‘outsider’ 
crimes by (illegal) immigrants (see Solivetti 2004, 2007).
Problems in comparing prison rates
Cavadino and Dignan’s thesis is certainly very convincing, even if it is not 
the only way of using differences in rates of incarceration as indicators of 
comparative punitiveness.5 Neo-liberalism in the USA and Europe does 
Table 1 Imprisonment rates per 100,000 in 12 countries, 2002/3 and 2008
2002/3 2008
Neo-liberal countries
USA 701 756
South Africa 402 334
New Zealand 155 185
England and Wales 141 152
Australia 115 129
Conservative-corporatist countries
Italy 100 92
Germany 98 89
Netherlands 100 100
France 93 96
Social democracies
Sweden 73 74
Finland 70 64
Oriental-corporatist countries
Japan 53 63
Sources: 2002/3 – Cavadino and Dignan (2006a: 22); 2008 – King’s College London, 
International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief, URL (accessed 3 March 
2009): http://www.kcl.ac.uk/depsta/law/research/icps/worldbrief/wpb_stats.php.
5 Marcelo Aebi, when offering his annual interpretations of Council of Europe penal statistics, 
simply uses geographical criteria to contrast groups of countries with different levels of 
incarceration, distinguishing, from high to low, Eastern Europe, the Caucasian area, Central 
Europe, Western Europe, South Eastern Europe, Southern Europe, and the Scandinavian 
countries. Although certainly less ambitious and less illuminating than Cavadino and Dignan’s 
approach, the similarities in prison rates within each area are striking and are likely explained 
by wider socio-economic-political similarities and (or?) by which countries are treated locally 
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seem to be associated with factors that lead to less concern with ‘including’ 
potential offenders, and its rise coincides in many of these countries with 
greater use of the prison. But, insofar as it claims to be an explanation 
of punitive ness, it should be noted that the authors actually define neo-
liberalism as including punitive attitudes. In addition, their explanation 
may be limited in its range. Countries such as China make very heavy use of 
prison without being neo-liberal. Others, such as Russia (as well as South 
Africa, which is one of the countries they seek to explain), have seen a rise in 
neo-liberalism together with a reduction in the use of prison. This suggests 
that a wider variety of variables than those connected to neo-liberalism can 
lead to higher or lower punitiveness.
Even if we take the argument on its own terms, however, there are a 
number of questions that need to be raised about relying on prison rates as 
an index of punitiveness. A concept as intricate as punitiveness is poorly 
represented by a single indicator such as the detention rate. Are crime levels 
the same in each of the countries being compared? What do prison rates 
refer to? Why is there so much volatility over time? Do prison rates only 
reflect factors internal to the countries concerned? How large a part of the 
ex planation of prison rates is to be attributed to differences in criminal 
procedure?
Take first the problem of crime levels. For Table 1 to make sense we 
must assume that levels are roughly similar in each of the countries being 
com pared. Higher prison rates in countries dealing with higher levels of 
crime would not make news, and we could not easily say we were compar-
ing levels of punitiveness if the crime threat being faced was different. There 
are reasons to think, for example, that England and Wales does have higher 
levels of some crimes (e.g. burglary), while Japan certainly has overall lower 
levels of crime. Perhaps more important, it is strange that the good things 
about belonging to more inclusive welfare-oriented or social democratic 
societies do not also reduce the level or severity of crimes being committed 
(and not only shape the response to them). But in that case can we still 
say that a country is, relatively, less ‘punitive’ if it faces less crime? Above 
all, we need to know how to get to grips with the variety of factors within 
as exemplars to conform to. It is unclear if such differences always coincide with contrasts in 
degrees of neo-liberalism. In complete contrast, Jan Van Dijk, a leading Dutch criminologist, 
has compiled a worldwide ‘punitiveness scale’ that pays scant attention to geography but 
subtracts the relative rank of countries in annual homicide rates from their rank in levels of 
incarceration (i.e. greater punitiveness means having more people in prison than would be 
expected from the number of murders in the country). On this criterion, Finland, Sweden and 
Norway turn out to be lenient but so does Australia, whereas Germany and Italy turn out to 
be relatively punitive (see Van Dijk 2007: 270 and 370–4). This intriguing if somewhat crude 
strategy begs the question of whether relative punitiveness is in fact correlated with crime 
levels, and in any case places too much reliance on only one crime measure.
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the penal process itself that actually produce its prison rates. Many of the 
countries that have lower overall rates – Sweden for example, or Switzerland 
(or the Netherlands in its glorious period) – use shorter prison terms, but 
actually send relatively more people to prison than those with higher overall 
rates. Does this show less punitiveness than sending fewer people for longer 
periods? It certainly complicates any argument we may want to make about 
punitiveness and inclusiveness.6
The empirical basis for the argument may be less solid than it seems. 
Table 1 offers snapshots from 2002/ 3 and 2008, but prison rates in different 
countries in earlier periods have not always varied in ways that confirm 
the argument. And they have again diverged from it more recently. For 
example, after the Second World War Finland’s rate went down sharply 
from one far higher than its Scandinavian neighbours (187 per 100,000, 
Lappi-Seppälä 2001),7 whereas the Netherlands, as already mentioned, 
went in the opposite direction so as to give it, for a while, one of the highest 
rates in Europe.8 Even the USA had a moderate level of use of prison until 
the 1970s. According to 2006 figures, Italy, with a rate of only 65.2 per 
100,000 had the lowest prison population amongst Continental European 
countries (Proband 2008). But the explanation for this does not lie with the 
generosity of its welfare or work- training systems (welfare payments mainly 
go to pay pensions). Its current low rate owes a lot to the recent indulto (or 
col lective pardon), which freed over a third of its prison inmates.9 Although 
this is a particularly striking example, the importance of the indulto under-
lines the centrality of the criminal justice process to understanding the 
significance of prison rates. It is impossible to understand the figures for 
France, for example, without taking its amnesties and pardons into account. 
Aside from the difficult task of trying to ‘purify’ comparative figures of such 
interventions, it could also be argued that it is fruitless, since the willingness 
to use amnesties could itself be taken as an illustration of tolerance.
Such volatility is not always easy to reconcile with claims about 
the dependence of such rates on underlying basic differences in political 
6 Commentators on prison rates such as Aebi distinguish between ‘stock’ (how many are held 
in prison), ‘flow’ (how many see the inside of a prison) and the average sentence lengths in 
prison (for how long prisoners are held in custody). Punitiveness rankings vary considerably 
depending on which of these criteria is selected.
7 Finland’s rate of imprisonment declined to 154 per 100,000 in 1960, 113 in 1970, 106 in 
1980, 69 in 1990 and 55 in 2000.
8 The Netherlands’ rate was only 84 in every 100,000 in 1999 but then increased in a few years 
to higher than 130 – occasioning an extensive academic commentary seeking to ‘explain’ this 
new punitiveness. The rate has again declined more recently. See Aebi and Stadnic (2007).
9 Although the indulto postdates the Council of Europe’s 2005 annual survey, the small print 
indicates that it was somehow taken into account, and Italy is indicated as a country that has 
seen a recent 36 percent decline in its prison population. Its prison population is now again 
rising and is predicted to shortly reach pre-indulto levels.
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economy. But, apart from anything else, countries’ prison rates are not just 
a reflection of their attitudes to offenders or potential offenders. They are 
also a product of reflexive responses by politicians and policy makers to 
their per ceptions of where their country stands in relation to other places. 
Thus the reduction in Finnish prison sentences and the increase in the Dutch 
level were in part responses to the prison rates in countries to which they 
thought they could and would be compared. Roy Walmsley, an adviser 
to the United Nations, whose figures were the source of Cavadino and 
Dignan’s table (see Walmsley 1999), urges all countries to shape their 
criminal justice prac tices so as to aim at a rate of no more than 100 
prisoners per 100,000 of the population,10 and so obviously assumes that 
this can be brought about irrespective of more fundamental changes in a 
country’s political economy. Tables such as theirs, in addition to their role 
as explanatory aids, are therefore capable of changing policy – and are 
often intended to do so. They should be treated not just as a resource for 
explaining differences in prison rates but also as social artefacts whose func-
tion lies in their utility for local struggles about penal practices.
But my main concern here is not to point to the difficulties or advant-
ages of using international statistics as such, but rather to ask how research 
on comparative incarceration rates can help us rethink our approaches to 
the possible sources of punitiveness and leniency rather than only reinforce 
what we already think and value. Criminologists who attempt to explain 
which states in the USA have the highest prison rates typically single out 
correlations with factors such as lower welfare levels, a lack of effort to 
ensure economic equality, and low public participation. These are all mat-
ters that they tend to consider negative factors in their own right. But the 
so-called ‘evil causes evil’ fallacy may artificially restrict explanations of 
punishment as much as it does those of crime (see Cohen 1970)11 – all the 
more so in cross-cultural contexts. Applied to Cavadino and Dignan’s argu-
ment, there does seem to be something ethnocentric about a thesis so well 
suited to telling policy makers in countries affected by neo-liberalism that 
evidence from other countries shows us that only more welfare provision 
and government regulation of the economy can provide a prophylactic 
against punitiveness.
More may be going on than the adoption of a more or a less inclusive 
approach to (potential) offenders. A cultural propensity to inclusion may 
10 Interestingly, Walmsley’s (2003) recommendations of how to reach this goal include 
avoiding short prison sentences even though the countries with the lowest rates include ones 
that make most use of such sentences.
11 I do not of course want to argue that ‘evil’ factors are never responsible for ‘evil’ out-
comes – and vice versa – only to suggest that such cultural bias can prevent us seeing other 
possibilities.
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be, in some sense, a relevant cross-cultural factor. The Dutch did pioneer 
a sharp reduction in the use of prison (Downes 1988), and the Italians too 
were leaders in the de-carceration movement, which aimed to have mental 
patients and others treated in the community rather than in total institutions. 
But the sense we give to this can be fully appreciated only by learning much 
more about the countries concerned. It is controversial how far the rate 
of immigration affects prison rates. But it is certainly important to bear in 
mind that some of the Scandinavian countries with low prison rates have 
experienced relatively small flows of immigration, or have even done their 
best to limit ‘economic migration’.
It is also hard to learn much from a table that suggests that such differ-
ent places as the Netherlands and Italy are equally punitive – and implies 
that this is for similar reasons of political economy. Compared with the 
Netherlands, for example, Italy’s inclusiveness has less to do with the guid-
ing role of the regulatory state than it does with attitudes of low respect 
for the legality mandated by the national state, combined with a cultural 
emphasis on forgiveness, solidarity and fraternalism deriving from current 
local interpretations of a strong Catholic heritage and left-wing ideologies 
(Nelken 2000). Importantly, neither of Italy’s two leading belief systems 
allows individual victims of crime to occupy the moral high ground. In terms 
of socio economic factors, rather than pointing to political economy as such 
(even though in fact Italian criminologists have been pioneers in this style of 
explanation), it is important to recognize the continuing centrality in Italy 
not only of the family and the extended family (especially important with 
respect to the handling of juvenile delinquency) but also of family-like groups 
in maintaining social order in many sectors of public and private life. Nor is 
this necessarily evidence of Continental European ‘corporatist’ collab oration 
between business and government. Many of those helping to maintain ‘order’ 
in the southern regions of Italy are actually organized criminals!
The importance of courts and criminal procedure in Italy
To show why it is unwise to look for causes of high and low punitiveness 
only in the factors that are highlighted in Cavadino and Dignan’s thesis, I 
shall now examine, using Italy as an illustration, the question of the place 
that needs to be given in any explanation of punitiveness to the role of the 
criminal justice system itself. It is easy to see that political economy can 
shape punitiveness only through mediating variables.12 Yet the role of the 
12 Cavadino and Dignan, who are continuing to develop their ideas, now call for more 
exploration of the intermediate factors that connect political economy to punishment – 
including crime levels, general culture, media culture, political culture and political institutions 
(Cavadino and Dignan 2008).
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criminal process itself remains somewhat ambiguous. Even if what happens 
inside the criminal justice complex ultimately makes all the difference, is 
this part of the ‘why’ or only the ‘how’ of punitiveness? How can we decide 
whether the criminal process is the dependent variable in our explanation or 
(also) an independent one? Consideration of the Italian case gives us reason 
to see criminal procedure as an independent or at least semi-autonomous 
variable in its own right – and not merely as a conduit for wider economic 
and political factors or changes.
But – and this constitutes a further challenge for Cavadino and Dignan’s 
argument – the degree of such autonomy is itself a sociocultural variable. 
There are significant differences between countries such as Italy and Anglo-
American countries with regard to how far it is thought constitutionally 
appropriate for criminal justice to be responsive to political direction or to 
social expectations. This has obvious implications for the extent to which, at 
the level of everyday decision-making by judges and prosecutors, the criminal 
justice system seeks to defend its ‘relative’ autonomy from both political 
and public pressures. Drawing on her knowledge of German arrangements, 
Lacey (2008) suggests that it is collaboration between politicians, policy 
makers and courts that is likely to keep prison rates down. But the Italian 
experience suggests that it can also be the refusal of such collaboration 
that can lead to this result. The main resistance in Italy to the latest efforts 
by politicians to encourage the mass criminalization of illegal immigrants 
comes from a uniquely strong corps of self -governing and independent 
judges and prosecutors,13 whose priorities are often different from those of 
both the politicians and the public.
It is only by looking at criminal procedure that we can make sense of 
the paradox of why, despite many reasons that could lead us to expect the 
opposite, Italy can occupy an average and sometimes low rung in prison rates 
amongst major European countries. This is a country with an enormous 
number of criminal laws, many of which are regularly – even routinely – 
breached at all levels of society. Penal rules and judicial interventions are 
often relied on as a substitute for political and policy-led decision-making, 
given that other forms of civil or administrative regulation work (even more) 
poorly. In four regions of the country, powerful organized crime groups 
control or subject to their ‘taxes’ large parts of the economy and often con-
dition what goes on in regional and local politics. Newspapers are full of 
13 Even after the reform of criminal procedure was supposed to have moved Italy towards 
the accusatorial model, prosecutors and judges form part of the same category, with similar 
constitutional guarantees of independence and immovability, and are entitled to shift (subject 
to conditions) from one task to another. There are increasing pressures to introduce the so-
called ‘separation of careers’, but this is politically highly controversial because many see it as 
the route to reducing prosecutors’ independence from political influence.
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crime news, and criminal prosecution can be a potent weapon for assigning 
stigma. In the so-called Tangentopoli anti-corruption investigations of the 
1990s, all the established parties of government were swept from power 
through the enforcement of laws concerning election finance and corruption 
of public works contracts, even if few of these individuals stayed in prison 
for long. Over the recent years in which prison rates have fallen, illegal 
immi gration has continued to increase, as has the tendency for the police 
to concentrate their attention on the crimes of immigrants as easy targets. 
What is more, prosecution in Italy is constitutionally obligatory; so there is 
no easy way out by using formally mandated types of diversion. So how is 
it possible that prison rates have sunk so low?
In Italy’s case – though I would claim that some of the same mechan-
isms are also often significant elsewhere – the answer is that this has little to 
do with levels of welfare or a state project aimed at the inclusion of marginal 
individuals, but has everything to do with the operations of its system of 
justice. Prison rates are low because of processes of attrition; although many 
cases start out, few arrive at a conclusion. All systems of criminal justice are 
to some degree intended to be selective (as seen in the now famous distinc-
tion in Anglo-American literature between the requirements of ‘due process’ 
and the objectives of ‘crime control’). But systems differ between themselves 
(and over time) in the way they construct and operate such selectivity. In 
Italy, the typical procedural guarantees of the accusatorial system (centring 
on the forensic contest of the trial) that were introduced in the 1989 reform 
of criminal procedure were simply added to the ones that belong to the 
inqui sitorial tradition. This means that even quite minor cases go through 
a series of procedural hoops and are reviewed by a large number of judges, 
and there are two stages of appeal (the first stage being a retrial on the facts). 
There are complex rules about informing the accused and his/her lawyers 
of trial hearings at each stage of the proceedings and extensive periods are 
allowed for them to prepare their defence each time. It is not infrequent 
for such notifications to go astray, especially where there is more than one 
accused and lawyer involved.
All this has obvious repercussions in terms of the time cases take to 
reach final disposal in Italy. Crucially, the so-called ‘prescription’, or statute 
of limitations, period after which criminal proceedings become null and 
void continues to run until the Cassation court has given its final verdict. 
And this can sometimes take over 10 years.14 Partly under the shock of the 
Tangentopoli investigations, in which politicians were the main targets, laws 
14 This period after which ‘prescription’ sets in varies with the severity of the offence. Prime 
Minister Berlusconi is among those who have benefited from this procedural nullification of 
criminal charges.
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were passed that allowed those sentenced to less than three years in prison 
to apply to be put instead under what is often little more than nominal 
social work tutelage outside prison. Likewise, resources are stretched when 
it comes to supervising those let out on parole. This formed the larger back-
ground against which a large-scale indulto – or collective pardon – was 
passed by the centre–left government in 2006 (after a long period in which 
the events of Tangentopoli had made the use of ‘amnesties’ politically 
unacceptable).
Many of the procedural benefits of the Italian criminal justice system 
are not available to illegal immigrants ‘caught in the act’ of committing 
crimes, and it is these offenders (and low-level drug dealers) who now 
tend to fill the prisons. ‘Security’ has also become an ever more important 
polit ical issue, as shown with the return of a centre–right government in 
2008 whose campaign played on linked concerns over immigration and 
crime.15 Although the Northern League and the ex-fascist National Alliance 
parties, junior members/allies of Berlusconi’s Liberty Party, had strongly 
emphasized crime issues even before, it is only recently that the issue of 
‘street crime’ has become such an important part of both national and 
local politics.16 Overlooking the considerable cross-party support at the 
time it was passed,17 the new government was also able to exploit the un-
po pularity of the latest indulto. This measure is likely to have increased 
crime levels, not least because those let out of prison were not provided 
with any incentive to reform themselves. But it is still not clear how far the 
new government will really tighten up on the kind of medium-level crimes 
typically committed by Italian offenders. Whether this happens again seems 
less dependent on shifts towards neo-liberalism than on the extent to which 
politicians can be satisfied that they will not be in the firing line of any 
expedited proceedings.18
But is Italy just a special case? (As Mrs Thatcher liked to say, when 
characterizing various countries in the European Union – ‘and then there’s 
Italy’.) Its politics may be somewhat unusual, but I would argue that 
15 Until very recently the Italian expression that encompassed conventional crimes including 
burglary, rape and robbery was ‘micro-criminality’, used as a broad contrast to corruption, 
terrorism and organized crime, which threaten the state itself.
16 Directly elected local mayors, as much on the left as on the right, have been vocal about the 
measures they are taking to maintain local order using local municipal police agents, even if 
they do not officially have responsibility for the enforcement of criminal justice.
17 The indulto was widely seen as having been motivated by politicians of the right and the left 
(then in power) looking after their friends. But it was justified at the time in terms of prison 
overcrowding and carried the express approval of Pope Jean Paul II.
18 One of the first acts of the Berlusconi government elected in 2008 was to pass a law that 
sought to block for a year all proceedings in which the possible prison sentence was less than 
10 years. This ‘happened’ to have the effect of interrupting one court case in which the Premier 
was himself involved.
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criminal procedure and case-attrition are also a large part of the explanation 
of how other countries with low prison rates kept them low in the past – or 
still do so. Germany, for example, diverts around half of its prosecutions, 
and France in the 1980s and 1990s repeatedly resorted to amnesties as a 
response to prison overcrowding. The Netherlands and Switzerland used to 
send offenders home to wait until a place was ready for them in prison. At 
a minimum therefore we will have to add differences in criminal procedure 
to the range of explanatory factors canvassed by Cavadino and Dignan.19 
But the more we emphasize the role of this factor as an explanation in its 
own right, the more it becomes difficult to draw a line between, on the one 
hand, the broader political and economic factors that they treat as their 
independent variables and, on the other, the dependent variable – prison 
rates – that their independent variables are intended to explain.
The cultural meanings of punitiveness and tolerance
A second set of issues concerns the cross-cultural meaning of Cavadino and 
Dignan’s dependent variable. The observer may choose to define ‘punitive-
ness’ and ‘tolerance’ by fiat in terms of prison rates. But in some societies 
these responses may not even be thought to lie on the same continuum 
(Nelken 2006). There are many other questions to be clarified. Is tolerance 
to be seen as the outcome of deliberate choice – for example, the willingness 
to organize welfare interventions – or does it extend to deliberate (or even 
negligent) non-enforcement of available sanctions? Who is being said to be 
punitive or tolerant – politicians, legal professionals or the public? With 
respect to what sort of behaviour are these terms being applied? Are we 
talking of neutral ‘facts’ or of value judgements (and whose judgements 
count)? In sum, it is moot how far we can compare punitiveness and tolerance 
in different cultures without specifying what (various) actors in each of the 
societies concerned mean by these terms. Those who compare prison rates 
seek to avoid this problem by deducing intentions from outcomes. But if 
we ignore intentions it becomes difficult to be sure that we are comparing 
like with like. For example, is the effort to ‘change’ individuals, an aim that 
formed a central part of the ideology of the welfare-rehabilitative ap proach 
to offenders, a more or a less punitive intervention than the use of prison? 
Or is it really irrelevant that what I call tolerance you may call permissive-
ness, indulgence, favouritism, neglect, indifference, impunity, denial or 
collusion?
19 Lacey (2008) seems to opt for this solution.
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It is in pursuing this sort of interpretative enquiry that comparative 
research risks the opposite problem, that of relativism. We are told for 
example that in the Netherlands the term gedogen is not readily translatable 
into English or any other language. ‘The term is Dutch. The concept is 
Dutch, and its application only works in Holland.’20 Gedogen does not 
correspond, for example, to the English term ‘tolerance’ because that can 
also be passive, whereas the Dutch concept refers to an open-eyed tolerance 
– a matter of government policy. Comparison with Italy reveals even more 
significant differences. In the Netherlands, gedogen lies behind official 
willingness to accommodate exceptions to the law. But in Italy the state 
can never explicitly approve such accommodation because of the fear that 
the law will then be bent to the interests of those who wish to achieve 
immu nity for their own misdeeds while targeting their opponents.21 Italian 
commentators speak less about being ‘tolerant’ than of the need to subject 
the criminal process to strict procedural requirements or garanzie.22 But, in 
practice, ‘tolerance’ as non-enforcement comes about de facto because the 
legislative body tends to multiply offences at the same time as doing nothing 
about the considerable difficulties that exist when it comes to enforcing 
them. Sometimes government impotence may also merge into collusion with 
elite crime – what has been described as ‘ruling through leniency’ (Melossi 
1994). More generally, de facto toleration may be a way of currying popular 
favour through laxity in enforcing rules and a readiness to accept amends 
after the event.
But attention to these contrasts in the social meanings of tolerance 
does not have to lead us to a relativist approach. Such a theoretical posi-
tion would rule out the possibility of even grasping the existence of these 
differences. And it would miss the point that penal approaches are often 
highly contested within the societies concerned, and that perceptions of 
their acceptability change over time – in part because of exposure to prac-
tices in other societies. Despite often ‘ruling through leniency’, Italy has 
also seen major investigations into political corruption and considerable 
suc cesses in the fight against the Mafia. On the other hand, despite a tend-
ency to distrust the state and to side with those who suffer its vexations, 
there is now increasing ambivalence (mobilized by much of the media) 
20 Taken from the website of the philosophy department of Erasmus University in Rotterdam. 
Of course, this term also gets its sense as part of a larger semantic field including, amongst 
others, the key term beleid; see Blankenburg and Bruinsma (1995).
21 In the same way, the Italian term for ‘discretionary’ is used rarely in a positive sense but 
rather as the semantic equivalent of ‘arbitrariness’.
22 Ferrajoli (1989). A leading Dutch critical criminologist, René Van Swaaningen, argued 
strongly that garantismo represented a key idea for all critical criminologists to take up (Van 
Swaaningen 1997).
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towards the continued ‘tolerance’ of everyday crime through attrition, or 
the ‘inexplicable’ way in which even alleged serious criminals can find them-
selves still at large while awaiting trial or benefit in other ways from what 
seem like excessive procedural formalities. Such re-thinking is seen in the 
increasing currency of terms such as buonismo (pretentious generosity at 
others’ expense), perdonismo (being too ready to forgive everything) or 
garanzie pelose (so-called ‘hairy’ procedural guarantees, which are seen 
by some as measures pretending to protect the accused’s rights but really 
aiming to create a system whereby it will be possible, if needed, to get certain 
accused people ‘off the hook’ at all costs).
There would also be more to be said about the changing relationship 
between tolerance of offending, on the one hand, and tolerance of sexual 
deviance, moral ambiguity and cultural difference, on the other. It has 
been argued that, in late modernity, tolerance for some kinds of deviance 
(for example sexual deviance) may have increased, but that there is now 
less willing ness to reform and reintegrate those who engage in offending 
(Young 1999). This process clearly varies from place to place (and disap-
proval of offending may often be a covert way of refusing difference). In the 
Netherlands, the differences between the two kinds of tolerance, and the 
way they have evolved recently, is well evidenced by the late Pim Fortuyn’s 
flamboyant display of an alternative sexual lifestyle combined with his in-
sistence on the threat represented by Muslim immigration. Such changes in 
what Cavadino and Dignan describe as ‘attitudes towards inclusion’ have 
indeed affected the possibility of keeping prison rates down. Gedogen no 
longer has the widespread support it had (Buruma 2007). But once again, 
even if such changes in the cultural climate are undoubtedly themselves also 
influenced by developments in economic and political conditions, they are 
not simply reducible to them.
Conclusion
Just as it would be ethnocentric for Americans to assume that European 
criminal justice does or must work like that in the USA, for them, or 
English-speaking writers in general, to assume that European societies have 
fewer people in prison because they possess more regulated types of polit-
ical economy may also be misleading (Nelken 2003). Ethnocentrism can 
be a problem not only where we think our practices are the best, but also 
where we assume too quickly that the others from whom we wish to learn 
are acting on the basis of what we think would be best practice (Cain 2000). 
Adopting an approach that attempts explicitly to get beyond ethnocentrism 
and relativism shows that simply calling for more of the solidarity and 
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inclusiveness that is assumed to characterize other societies with lower 
prison rates is the kind of short-cut that can easily miss the point. Learning 
from what others do is not so straightforward. On closer acquaintance we 
may well find that we like the outcome achieved by other systems of criminal 
justice, but not the means they use to get there – or vice versa.
But this message is not as negative as it might seem. Not only are there 
many things that can be learned from others, there are some matters that 
can only be learned from others. Reforms that emerge from within the same 
society often tend to reproduce the problems they are being asked to solve – 
precisely because they come from the same culture. Thus, in England and 
Wales – or the Netherlands – the answer to failures in the system is normally 
thought to be even more concern about efficiency. In Italy it is usually a re-
thinking of ‘values’ or principles that is invoked as the way forward. Often 
the best practice for us to learn from may therefore not always be best 
practice as such, but that which stretches our imagination about what is 
possible. Moving a little nearer to what we would otherwise never normally 
think of doing may be just what we need. And even learning what not to do 
can be useful, especially where this helps us to understand better why we 
make the sometimes hard choices we do.
In all this, interpreting what others are actually trying to do is essential 
even if – or especially if – the social actors we are studying do not have, 
nor could have, all the answers to our – or even to their – problems. If we 
are to intervene in a helpful way in public debates and policy-making, we 
must be able to engage with what actors think they are doing, and why it 
makes sense to them (insofar as it does so). I offer two examples to close 
with. I am currently engaged in comparative research into the handling of 
juvenile delinquency in England and Wales. This jurisdiction currently has 
one of the highest rates in Europe for the incarceration of juveniles and cer-
tainly much higher than that of Italy. If you ask the legal actors and others 
involved in the system why this is so, you will not usually hear them saying 
anything about trying to be punitive or intolerant. Rather, they claim to 
be doing their best to help children before they get into further trouble.23 
The number of youngsters ending up in prison is increasing as a result of 
government insistence on a quick through-put of cases. This is because per-
sistent offenders run through the gamut of non-penal alternatives more 
quickly. But, again, this policy was ostensibly put in place in the interests 
of the offenders themselves. Different working assumptions lie behind the 
levels of tolerance or leniency in dealing with young people in different 
23 Even if, for some of those involved, it feels like a Faustian pact by which they have to agree 
to the risk of increasing criminalization in return for continuing access to welfare resources 
for deprived youths.
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places. In England and Wales it is thought that children will not easily grow 
out of delinquency without official intervention. In Italy, on the other hand, 
there is a legally enshrined presupposition that in the majority of cases they 
will do so.
On the other hand, Italy has one of the highest rates in Europe for the 
pro portion of illegal immigrants in prison, usually sent there for low-level 
property offences and drug-dealing. Why is it that these offenders do not 
benefit from the many procedural possibilities for delaying trial or avoiding 
prison? In part this is because they lack the legal competence and assist-
ance to do so. But, in addition, official actors do not always interpret the 
procedural possibilities for leniency that do exist in their favour. Italian law 
says that first offenders sentenced to terms of less than two years should 
normally have their prison sentences suspended, on the legal assumption 
that they have not offended before and are unlikely to do so again. Should 
this provision also be applied to illegal immigrants? According to some 
magistrates, immigrants are entitled to the same protections as anyone else; 
it is not their job to take into account sociological considerations. What is 
at stake is a matter of basic fairness and formal equality of treatment. Other 
judges think that such offenders may well have already had a criminal 
record abroad before immigrating; they also argue that it is unrealistic to 
assume that a person without home or work will not be tempted to re-offend 
and that if measures are not taken to stop offenders now they will do their 
best to disappear. Although both views are held within the magistracy, the 
first, more lenient, approach is being steadily undermined by political and 
media pressure.
In both of these examples, labelling one view ‘punitive’ and the other 
‘tolerant’ is not particularly helpful. The actors in each criminal justice 
system are up against the well-known difficulties of trying to find penal 
solutions to what are in fact larger social problems. Insofar as they have 
room for manoeuvre, their choices will reflect their conceptions of what 
courts can and should do in these situations (choices that may not be con-
sistent across the range of different kinds of social problems). This said, 
when it comes to the evaluation of criminal justice practices, whether actors 
think they are being tolerant or punitive is not the end of the matter. We 
can, do and should make our own defeasible claims about other people’s 
ideas and actions even where they would reject our interpretations. Not 
only self-confessed racists are racists! So it can make sense in some contexts 
to describe people as tolerant even if they do not intend to be (and vice-
versa). It can be helpful to show actors that things could be done differently, 
and that they are already being done differently, elsewhere. Increasing their 
awareness of this can help unpack the self-fulfilling assumptions of the 
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criminal justice systems they belong to. But we should not overestimate their 
ignorance of matters elsewhere,24 and we need to exercise great caution in 
substituting our accounts of what they are trying to do for their own.
In Italy, despite (or because of?) its low prison rate, ‘tolerance’ – or 
the local equivalents – has recently come to be seen by many as less and less 
something to be proud of but rather as evidence of the neglect of existing and 
potential victims. As one influential editorialist in a mainstream newspaper 
recently commented, in criticizing the latest indulto, ‘what right does the 
state have to pardon identified offenders at the expense of the unidentified 
victims who will suffer from the crimes that they will commit once released’. 
He ends by insisting that ‘public opinion is not bloodthirsty. It does not 
dream of taking revenge on Cain. Simply, it has eyes also for Abel and sees 
the solitude in which he has been left’ (Ricolfi 2007, my translation). To 
compete with this sort of rhetoric – aimed cleverly at reducing the religious 
and cultural aversion in Italy to what might otherwise might be seen as 
putting law at the service of ‘vendetta’ – one possible strategy could be to 
insist that there can be more constructive ways of punishing than prison. 
But alternatives to prison do have their own costs and difficulties, and they 
are hard to apply in the case of offenders who have arrived in a country as 
irregular – and supposedly unwanted – immigrants. What seems undeniable 
is that, in the current penal climate, if we are to propose the adoption of 
different practices we will normally need to do more than merely show that 
they are – in their outcome – less punitive. Timing is everything.
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